

# Introduction to Security Protocols

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# Outline

- Introduction
- Security Services and Mechanisms
- Public Key Certificates
- Security Protocols

# The Problem

- Internet evolved in a world without predators; denial-of-service was viewed as illogical and undamaging
- The world today is hostile, and a tiny fraction of the machine population can do a lot of damage
- Must connect mutually distrustful organizations and people with no central management
- Society expects a reliable Internet, which exceeds “traditional” security concerns

# Security is ...

- Data is only disclosed to intended recipients
- Monitor and track down “bad guys”
- Prevent data corruption
- Destroy computers with pirated content
- Anonymous communication

Security means different things  
to different people!

# Intruders can ...

- Eavesdrop
  - Links, compromise routers, routing algorithms, or DNS
- Send arbitrary messages
- Replay recorded messages
- Modify messages in transit
- Trick people into running malicious code

# Security Services (1 of 2)

- **Confidentiality**

Assurance that the message content can only be read by the intended recipients

- **Data Integrity**

Assurance that message content has not been altered

- **Authentication**

Assurance that stated message originator is correct

- **Non-repudiation**

Assurance that the original message originator cannot deny the message content

# Security Services (2 of 2)

## ■ Access Control

Assurance that a resource can only be used in an authorized manner

- ◆ Identity-based Access Control
- ◆ Rule-based Access Control
- ◆ Role-based Access Control
- ◆ Rank-based Access Control

# Examples to Motivate (1 of 3)

- File Sharing
  - File store must authenticate users
  - File store must know who is authorized to read and/or update the files
  - Information must be protected from disclosure and modification in transit
  - Users must authenticate the file store
    - ◆ Otherwise, files are given to the attacker



# Examples to Motivate (2 of 3)

- Electronic Mail
  - Send private messages
  - Know the sender of the message
  - Know the message has not been modified
  - Non-repudiation – a third party can know the original sender and the message content
  - Anonymity

# Examples to Motivate (3 of 3)

- Electronic Commerce
  - Pay for things without giving away my credit card number to an eavesdropper or phoney merchant
  - Buy anonymously
  - Merchant can prove who placed the order

**The examples further illustrate:**


**Security means different things  
to different people**

# Sometimes the goals conflict

- Privacy vs. Company (or Government) desire to monitor network traffic
- Losing data vs. Disclosure
- Denial of service vs. Preventing intrusion


# Confidentiality

- Encryption protects information from unauthorized disclosure
- Only parties that have the cryptographic key can recover the message content



# Encryption

- Encryption renders a plaintext message unintelligible by all parties, except those that have the key needed to turn the ciphertext back into plaintext



# Encryption Algorithms

- AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
  - FIPS 197
  - Three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits
- Triple-DES
  - ANSI X9.52
  - Either two or three 56-bit DES keys
- RC4
  - RSA Security
  - Variable length key, up to 256 bits

# Data Integrity

- Assurance that the message content has not been altered
- Cryptographic checksums, usually based on one-way hash functions, provide data integrity
- “Hashing” produces a small value that uniquely represents the message content
  - If two message contents differ only by a single bit, they will have very different hash values



# One-way Hash Functions (1 of 2)

- One-way hash functions provide data integrity
- Provide a hash value of uniform size for any length message
- Computationally infeasible to:
  - Derive the original message from the hash value
  - Create a second message with the same hash value as the original message

# One-way Hash Functions (2 of 2)


- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1)
  - FIPS 186-1
  - 160-bit hash value
- MD5
  - RSA Security
  - 128-bit hash value
- SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
  - FIPS 186-2 (and supplement)
  - 224-, 256-, 384-, and 512-bit hash values

# Authentication


- Assurance that message originator is as claimed
- Some authentication mechanisms can only be verified by a partner that shares a secret value, but others can be verified by anyone
- Historically, authentication in computer and network systems is based on a user name and a password; however, more secure mechanisms are readily available

# Unilateral and Mutual Authentication

- Unilateral (one-way)
  - User is authenticated to system



- Mutual (two-way)
  - User is authenticated to system
  - System is also authenticated to user



# Non-repudiation


- Assurance that the message originator cannot deny the message content
- A third party (like a judge or arbitrator) can verify the data integrity and authentication, preventing the message originator from falsely denying that they sent the message or it's content
- Non-repudiation usually makes use of a digital signature

# Public Key Cryptography

- Public key cryptography is an important mechanism used to implement all of the security services
- Public key cryptography is often combined with other mechanisms in a total solution
- Two keys: public key and private key
- Common public key algorithms include RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, and ECDH

# Digital Signature

- A one-way hash function is used to create a hash of the data to be signed
- A digital signature is cryptographic transformation of the hash value and the signer's *private* key



# Digitized vs. Digital Signature

- A digitized signature is a scanned image that can be placed on any document
- A digital Signature is a numeric value that is created by performing a cryptographic operation that involves the private key of the signer

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Russ". The letters are cursive and fluid.

**Digitized Signature**

```
1A56B29FF6310CD326109F200D5EF71  
9A274C66821B09AC3857FD62301AA27  
00AB3758B6FE93DE31009ACFCD39261
```


**Digital Signature**



# Digital Signature Validation (1 of 2)

- The digitally signed message content and the digital signature value are sent to the recipient
- The recipient hashes the message content, then using the sender's *public* key, performs a digital signature verification
  - The recipient must not use the hash value computed by the message originator
- The verification will either pass or fail

# Digital Signature Validation (2 of 2)



# Digital Signature Algorithms

- RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)
- DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm)
- ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA)

# Public Key Certificates


- Certificates bind an identity to a *public* key
- An issuing or certifying authority builds a certificate that contains:
  - Subject's Name
  - Subject's Public Key
  - Issuer's Name
- The issuer digitally signs the certificate
  - No one can change its contents

# Certification Authority

- Establish and maintain an accurate binding between the public key and attributes contained in a certificate
- Manages and publishes certificates
  - Issues and renews certificate
  - Issues Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- Initializes tokens (optional)
- Generates and provides recovery for public/private key pairs (optional)


# Certification Path

Alice can verify Bob's certificate by verifying a chain of certificates starting at one issued by a Certification Authority (CA) she trusts




# Public Key Infrastructure Topology

## Hierarchy



## Mesh




# Which PKI Structure?


- Not a technology driven choice
- Choose the PKI Structure that best implements the organization's policy
- A organization is authoritative for it's members
- One *trust anchor* can support multiple certification policies and multiple public key algorithms



# Cross Certification



# X.509 Certificate Format



# Name Forms

- Certificate subject and issuer identified by:
  - X.500 Distinguished Name
  - DNS Name
  - Internet E-mail Address
  - WWW URI
  - IP Address
  - Others . . .

# X.509 Certificate Extensions

- Authority Key Identifier
- Subject Key Identifier
- Key Usage
- Private Key Usage Period
- Certificate Policies
- Policy Mappings
- Subject Alternative Name
- Issuer Alternative Name
- Inhibit Any-Policy
- Basic Constraints
- Name Constraints
- Policy Constraints
- Extended Key Usage
- CRL Distribution Points
- Subject Directory Attributes
- Authority Information Access
- Subject Information Access
- Freshest CRL


# Attributes in Certificates

- Accurate binding of attributes to a public key
  - identity
  - authorization
  - policy expression
  - PKI management
- Is the CA authoritative for the attributes in the certificate?
- Steve Kent's Rule of Revocation:
  - “ The effective lifetime of a certificate is inversely proportional to the square of the number of attributes. ”

# But, Things Change ...

- Who owns the private key?
  - Certificate binds the private key owner's identity to the public key
- Is this binding still valid?
  - Certificate Revocation List (CRL) provides a list of the unexpired certificates that should no longer be used
    - ◆ Private key compromise
    - ◆ CA compromise
    - ◆ Affiliation changed
    - ◆ Superseded
    - ◆ CA ceased operation
    - ◆ ...

# X.509 CRL Format



# Trust in Certification Authorities

- CA trust should not be binary
  - “Is this CA trusted?”
- Instead, a CA should only be trusted for certain certificates
  - “Can I trust this CA to issue certificates for secure electronic mail?”



# Security Protocols – Which Layer?

- Layer 2
  - Protects link hop-by-hop
  - IP headers can be hidden from eavesdropper
    - ◆ Protects against traffic analysis
- Layer 3 and Layer 4
  - Protects end-to-end real-time conversation
- Application Layer (e.g., S/MIME)
  - Protects messages
  - Supports store-and-forward communication

# “Key Exchange”

- Mutual authentication/session key creation
  - Create “security association”
- Prefer to cryptographically protect entire session, not just initial authentication
- Prefer a new key for each session
- Examples
  - SSL/TLS or Secure Shell (Layer 4)
  - IPsec (Layer 3)

# Layer 3 vs. Layer 4 (1 of 2)

- Layer 3
  - Do not change applications or their APIs
  - OS provides security protocol
- Layer 4
  - Do not change OS
  - Application program provides security protocol
    - ◆ Perhaps by linking with a library
  - Run on top of Layer 4 (TCP or UDP)

# Layer 3 vs. Layer 4 (2 of 2)

- Layer 3 technically superior
  - Rogue packet problem
    - ◆ IPsec detects bogus packet injected by attacker before they are provided to TCP, which has no way to recover
  - Accommodates to do outboard hardware processing since each packet is independent
- Layer 4 is a lot easier to deploy
- Unless current API changes, layer 3 cannot provide authenticated identity to applications

# IPsec ESP

**SPI** identifies security association

**SEQUENCE NUMBER** detects replayed packets


**PAYLOAD** protected data, prefixed by an IV if required

**PAD** extends the plaintext payload

**PAD LEN** indicates the pad length

**NEXT** identifies payload protocol

**AUTHENTICATION DATA** contains integrity check value  
(**& OPTIONAL PADDING**)



## **Lesson learned:**

**Ease of deployment is more important than the robustness of the security solution**

# Questions?

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