
APRICOT Welcome! **APNIC Tutorial** Spam prevention: an update 21 February 2005, Kyoto, Japan APNIC In conjunction with APNIC19 / APRICOT 2005 APRICOT Overview • Background: spam • Problems, prevention & solutions - Consumers, Businesses and ISPs • Spam filtering & anti-spam services · Spam laws • Handling spam • APNIC involvement Summary APRICOT Quick quiz! © When you hear the word spam which one of these would you be thinking of? a) A salty, pink lunch meat that comes in a blue can? b) A British comedy troupe's skit with singing Viking warriors? c) Annoying junk mail and other advertisements you never asked for that are sent to you via the internet? d) All of the above

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Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	Advertisers Technical experts who do their own spamming Businesses who hire a third party to do the	
a Pacific N	Spam service providers (most common)	
	 Build up hardware, software & expertise need to send spam 	
APNIC	Advertise their services to distributorsSpam support services	
Ø AF	 ISPs/web hosting services that take any customer no matter what kind of activity they are involved in 	

APRICOT Damage between the spammer & your inbox · When spam hits the user a lot of costs have been incurred - By so many people other than the spammer - The more emails an ISP processes, the higher the costs - Affects Internet bandwidth - Fills up storage disks of ISP servers APNIC APNIC - More administrators needed • These costs are passed back to the users APRICOT Statistics - how critical? · According to email security provider Postini, nearly 75% of email traffic is spam - Over 1 billion unsolicited messages sent per - Amount is doubling every 5 months • AOL & Hotmail block around 2 billion spam each day & still more slipping through - Now the figure is 10 times higher than that of 5 years ago Source: http://www.postini.com/stats APRICOT Statistics - how critical? • Spam volume grows at 37% per month - an annual growth of 400% · Lots of spam appears to use foreign relays - Countries may need to work on spam legislations • Court cases between spammers & innocent APNIC victims - Only major corporations can afford such court cases

Source: InformationWeek Survey





Problems for consumers Privacy Concern about children receiving pornographic spam Mobile internet devices are getting popular. Charges based on contents or time to download

APRICOT Careful what to ask · How the attack works - Victims give away their own addresses Prevention - Use caution when choosing sites - Avoid giveaways & other "too good to be true" sites - Avoid signing up for sites that use an opt-out policy - Read sign-up screens carefully - Read privacy statement carefully how your email address and other personal information can be used, shared and sold APRICOT Keeping ahead of spammers Know where your email can be found · Guard your primary email address • Use stand-alone email software · Be careful with your browser • Choose an ISP that actively blocks spam • Find out how to filter your own email · Never click reply · Munged email addresses APRICOT **Email validation process** • Spammers are interested in only active accounts - Not only valid address but also active ones · Once the spammer has a list of email addresses - it is easy to take out the invalid and inactive addresses • See whether any bounce backs

APRICOT **Email validation process** • Spammer can determine validity based on the response - Ex: "This account does not exist", "Account could not be found", "The recipients inbox is full" etc. • Once the invalid addresses are deleted spammer use lower resources to send emails - Or even to sell the list APRICOT **Email validation process** • By sending a series of messages, attackers can determine - What time of day the user reads email - How often the user checks mail - What email program user uses - What operating system is being used - Whether user uses HTML or plain text email - Whether user always use the same computer to check mail etc. APRICOT **Problems for businesses** • Technical support costs - Invest resources in security investigations Spoofing - Spammers may use name of legitimate company in the From header or elsewhere in the email • Affects company reputation

APRICOT **Problems for businesses** Sexual harassment - Businesses could be held responsible for "hostile workplace environment" by not filtering out all pornographic spam Marketing difficulties - Many consumers subscribe to email lists from well-known companies APRICOT **Problems & attacks: Consumers / Businesses** Harvesting email APRICOT Web crawlers, robots Robots or spambots are used for email harvesting List of spambots http://www.sendfakemail.com/fakemail/antispam.html These tools work like browsers and catalog information found - Robot makes a request for a particular URL APNIC After the HTML page has been returned, the robot parses the HTML - Then locates all the links on the page - Loads each of these pages, and again continue parsing

APRICOT Web crawlers, robots • The robot also performs tasks with HTML on each page - eg: count pages for statistical analysis, index pages for search engines, mirror the content of web pages, etc. · List of common robots - http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/active/html/index.html APRICOT Web crawlers, robots • This technology can be used to find and extract email addresses - email addresses follow a particular pattern or regular expression (ex: "@" symbol) A robot can be configured to parse each page - look for email addresses - store them in a database APRICOT **Email patterns** • It can be easy for a spammer to guess email patterns for most companies - eg: first initial and last name are used to form an email address - A simple run through the alphabet with common last names yields many valid hits APNIC • Two guessing categories - Common email addresses or patterns - Blind guessing

APRICOT User exposure • Friends - Forwarding emails - New users who haven't faced bad experiences may be less cautious than more seasoned users · Parsing of lists · Address books - Help these users APRICOT Tracking emails to gather information · Many scams and hoaxes HTML mail - Email messages can contain colours, fonts and embedded graphics - Image isn't actually sent but connects to the website when the email program loads • Web bugs - Track the emails - How many times the mail program access the graphic etc. APRICOT **Hyperlinks** · Similar to web bugs - But require some interaction from users • Instead of simply viewing or opening an email message, the user needs to click a link or button - So the spammer knows the email account is APNIC • As with web bugs, hyperlinks can be coded to indicate what user clicked the link - The user may also be asked to supply additional information

APRICOT Vacation auto responders • Spammer determines that the email address is active - More information can be retrieved (time of the email message read, IP address, email program etc) - Some times the vacation responses can provide more info for spammers APRICOT Vacation auto responders I will be out of the office from August 15 through 28, attending a conference in Singapore. If you need to contact me, you can leave me a message at the Oasis, or you can send an email to my Yahoo account at jbright_test@yahoo.com. I will be checking that account remotely throughout the conference. If there is an emergency, please contact Cindy Jones at 617-234-1234 or at cindy_jones_test@mycompany.com. She will be filling in for me while I'm gone. APNI Jeff APRICOT Vacation auto responders I will be out of the office from August 15 through 28, attending a conference in Singapore. If you need to contact me, you can leave me a message at the Oasis, or you can send an email to my Yahoo account at jbright_test@yahoo.com. I will be checking that account remotely throughout the conference. If there is an emergency, please contact Cindy Jones at 617-234-1234 or at cindy_jones_test@mycompany.com. She will be filling in for me while I'm gone. APNI Jeff

Tricks

To: jbright_test@yahoo.com
From: emailservices_test@yahoo.com
Subject: Important Message
Jeff,
Tim Clarke has sent you an important message. Please click here to view this message.
Thanks,
Secure Email Services

Tricks

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- Indirect email access allows the email usage to be tracked and monitored easily
- When the user clicks the link, the web application logs that email address
- When you access an indirect email system the web browser automatically accepts content that your email program would have rejected

Spoofing email identities

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Return-Path: <test-user@company.com>
Received: from [66.38.203.132] by e-hostzz.comIP with HTTP;
Sun,: 31:55 +0400
From: "Tim" <test-user@company.com>
To: someuser@country.com
Subject: Re: CYXS, Contact!
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-mailer: mPOP Web-Mail 2.19
X-Originating-IP: [e-hostzz.comIP]
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2005 11:37:55 -0700
Reply-To: "Tim Wright" <test-user@company.com>

APRICOT **Phishing** • Starts as an email message to get users to go to a web site - To enter personal details for use in an identity scam • Web site looks similar to the real site APRICOT Using email addresses for other purposes • Web applications routinely store email address as data and as user ID - Any vulnerability in a web application's security can reveal this sensitive information - Need to use unique IDs APRICOT **Error message reasoning** • Error messages from web applications can expose email addresses - Login pages, forgotten password, registration are focus points for these type of attacks - The attacker can keep trying email IDs until the error message gives a clue

APRICOT **SQL** injection · Hacker tries to access the database behind the web application • If the web application doesn't have the proper controls in place, a hacker may be able to read all the information in the database APRICOT **SQL** injection Ex: web site that displays job listings can have a link such as http://www.mycompany.com/Jobs.asp?id=6236 A hacker can add a single quote or an apostrophe (') to the end of the URL and the following error message appears Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server error '80040el4' Unclosed quotation mark before the character string 'AND published=1'.
/Jobs.asp , line 20 APNIC The hacker now knows the page is vulnerable to SQL injection and can determine the DB schema and extract data from its tables APRICOT **Prevention & solutions: Consumers / Businesses**

APRICOT Robot exclusion standard · Administrators can indicate the directories/pages to ignore when following links - Creating a robot.txt file listing the restrictions or by using meta tags in HTML • Tags direct a robot to ignore the APNIC document and not follow any hyperlinks contained on the page <META NAME="ROBOTS" CONTENT="NOINDEX,
NOFOLLOW"> APRICOT Robot exclusion standard • To block all robots (ex: all robots should disallow all directories) User-agent: Disallow: / Selective restrictions (ex: disallow the webcrawler robot from the entire site and block the admin, dynamic and internal directories for all other robots) User agent: webcrawler Disallow: / APNIC User agent: *
Disallow: /admin
Disallow: /dynamic
Disallow: /internal APRICOT APNIC Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Confuse the robots • First don't publish any email address · Or consider using an automated program - sends email to you without revealing your email address on the web

APRICOT Confuse the robots Obfuscate - Allow email address to appear in web page but make it difficult for spambots to retrieve - Create email address in a way that a human being can understand but a spambot does not • Ex: instead of using ibright@example.com, use jbright-REMOVE THIS@example.com jbright@DELETE_THIS_FIRST.example.com APRICOT Confuse the robot • Place your email address on a web page as an image • Encoding the address in such a way that it no longer matches the email pattern APNIC HTML jbri<i></i>ght@<i></i>test.c<i></i>om MAPRICOT Confuse the robots · Can also use HTML encoding - Each character is replaced with its hexadecimal representation which server then decodes - Tools available: http://www.pgregg.com/projects/encode/ encode/htmlemail.php

APRICOT Confuse the robots • Web poison (spam poison) - Doesn't prevent email addresses from being harvested but attempt to taint the results - Sending back fake email addresses - Doesn't really alter spammer tactics - Possible that spammer may remove your domain from further scanning • But large number of addresses may focus the spammer more APRICOT Confuse the robots • Choose hard to guess email addresses that doesn't follow a standard pattern • Organisational policies that set standards for creating email addresses - Standards can also aid an spammer who is focusing on your company MAPRICOT Force spammer to use random guessing · Don't let them make educated and higher probability guess · Choose email addresses that don't follow established patterns - Ex: instead of tjones@myemail.com APNIC select ti0ne\$@myemail.com

APRICOT Restrict access to private data • Web application security may be outside your control · Carefully choose which site you register for - Reputed companies are more likely to deal with security vulnerabilities • Use a secondary email address for registering on web sites APRICOT Maintain your privacy · Use a secondary address for new friends • Ask to check out for hoax messages before forwarding - http://hoaxbusters.ciac.org · Ask only to forward the portion of the email they want others to read APNIC · Use BCC fields · Importance of antivirus tools and personal firewalls APRICOT **Tracking emails** • Risky to read your messages as HTML mail - If you accept only text mail • Tracking systems are ineffective • Speed up your email access - Viewing a HTML message in the preview pane is no different from opening it • As far as this type of attack is concerned

APRICOT **Hyperlinks** • Don't unsubscribe from spam unless you know that you have signed up for mails · Avoid clicking links in unwanted email · Provide only minimum information in an unsubscribe form APNIC • Observe the behavior when you use an unsubscribe feature APRICOT Vacation auto responders • Proactive rather than reactive - Can send emails (i.e if a small list) Restrict auto responder to certain people or those that matches particular rules Having multiple addresses APNIC - For work, for family & friends, etc. • Provide minimum information necessary APRICOT **Spoofing** · Confirm sender identity · Validate the message's authenticity - Check the mail headers · Attacker can add their own received lines to the email message APNIC - After it leaves their server they lose control over the subsequent received lines added to the header

APRICOT **Spoofing** • If the machine name on a received line doesn't match the IP address: - It is likely to be a forgery - All lines that follow should not be trusted - Do an IP lookup in whois APRICOT Restrict access to private data · Application security - Fix the web applications - Applications need to return general - Ensure that the site can't be used to mine email addresses from the database - Every input value to the application needs to be carefully checked and validated APRICOT Filters & spam reporting • Filters - Look at email messages and guess whether they are spam · Report and control spam - "Report spam" features of email programs

APRICOT Filters & spam reporting · Content filters - Block spam based on the content of the email message and header · Bayesian filters • Need to wait for few weeks for full effectiveness Whitelists - Whitelists define legitimate senders • What to do with mail from people who are not on the whitelists? APRICOT Filters & spam reporting · Collaborative filtering - Need to subscribe to filtering program - When spam lands in the mailbox, recipient can report it to the program's server - The server then searches the inboxes of all subscribers and deletes all copies of that message - With a large subscriber base, most people will see little spam APRICOT Challenge-response • Server holds all email from unrecognised addresses and sends an automated message • Automated message will verify that the sender is a real person or an automated bulk email program APNIC • Ok for some home users but inefficient for businesses

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O I	their systems - Excessive email traffic can crash the systems	
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Network In	Bounce messages Spammers usually put a fake email address in the Books To beader to avoid	
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	address in the Reply-To header to avoid bounces – Another ISP or user ends up getting	
	thousands of bounce messages, clogging the servers	
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APRICOT Costs · Dictionary attacks - Try multiple combinations of letters, at a popular domain name • This puts a huge drain on ISP's servers Customer complaints - Consumes a lot of helpdesk and customer service time - Large amounts of objectionable email can drive customers away APRICOT **SMTP** • SMTP is simple - No mechanism to verify the sending server or the accuracy of the from address - SMTP server has no way to verify messages such as "This message is from your bank and concerns your account" etc. APNIC • But SMTP is reliable and pretty much universally implemented APRICOT **Prevention & solutions: ISPs**

APNIC Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	Prevention & solutions: ISPs Contractual and cooperative solutions	
APNIC Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	Contractual and cooperative solutions • Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) - Spammers try to operate through open relays or by hijacking ISPs other than their own - ISPs need to have strong anti-spam policies - Prohibit these customers from sending spam through ISP servers	
Maria Pacific Network Information Centre	Contractual and cooperative solutions Pay-to-send and pay-to-transmit models Charge customers to send bulk email Internet community view Spammers still bypass their ISP servers Install their own SMTP servers and use open relays in foreign countries Hijack open proxies run by users with home networks	

APRICOT Contractual and cooperative solutions • E-stamps - Sender agree to pay money per message if the message is reported as spam • Bonded Sender Programs (BSP) - Sender deposits a sum of money with a bonding company per mailing Noted in the headers of the emails to ensure that they are not blocked by ISPs • If a recipient decides that the message is spam - It can be reported through a spam program - Recipient's ISP collects the money APRICOT **Prevention & solutions: ISPs Technological Solutions** APRICOT **Software solutions** • Software can partially stop the spam problem at several levels - Efficient tools for end users to control spam - Blocking techniques for ISPs - Sender authentication programs E-stamps, bonded sender programs or redesign the basic email protocol

APRICOT Whitelists & Blacklists Whitelists - Lists of servers known to be sending valid, legitimate emails - The address of the sending server can be compared to a whitelist · Blacklist filtering - Opposite of whitelists; lists of servers known to be operated by spammers - Block all incoming mail from the blacklisted addresses Many blacklists block all IP addresses from specific countries APRICOT **Multiparty solutions** • Need collaboration between ISPs, bulk mailers, and consumers - Options of redesigning the SMTP • Probably based on security certificates • Should be a secure, verified protocol like **HTTPS** APRICOT Prevent spam, phishing & viruses • Force accountability by identifying who is sending the message - Email authentication systems • SPF (Sender Policy Framework or Sender Permitted From) • Caller ID APNIC • Sender ID - Combines Pobox.com's SPF DomainKeys

MAPRICOT **SPF (Sender Policy** Framework) · SPF stops email address spoofing - Modify DNS to declare which servers can send mail from a particular Internet domain Once widely deployed, SPF records could be consulted by Mail Transfer Agents • They can check records for particular domains - Determine an email message's source is legitimate or spoofed APRICOT **SPF (Sender Policy Framework)** • SPF only checks for spoofing at the message transport level - Verifying the "bounce back" address for an email, which is sent before the body of a message is received - Tells the receiving email server where to send rejection notices

SPF (Sender Policy Framework)

• To patch the security weakness of SMTP

- Relay messages between host systems

- In recent years many viruses have exploited this flexibility

• SPF itself will not stop spam

- It will help other anti-spam technologies


• Enabling ISPs to track spam back to specific domains and forcing spammers to move to new domains more frequently

APRICOT **SPF (Sender Policy Framework)** • SPF Protocol still has problems - Incompatibility with some email forwarding services and Web sites that use mail forwarding features • Causes performance problems under certain circumstances APRICOT Caller ID • Microsoft-developed sender authentication technology - Tries to validate source address associated with an email message · Asks email senders to publish the IP address of their outgoing email servers - Part of an XML format email "policy" in the DNS record for their domain APRICOT Caller ID • Email servers & clients that receive messages check the DNS record • Match the "From" address in the message header to the published address of the approved sending servers APNIC • Email messages that don't match the source address can be discarded

APRICOT SPF and Caller ID • Microsoft agreed to merge its Caller ID with SPF • Organisations that send email will publish the addresses of their outgoing email servers in DNS using Extensible Markup Language (XML) APRICOT SPF and Caller ID • Possible to check for spoofing at the message body as well • With the merger, companies can use the SPF to reject spam messages before they are sent - if spoofing is detected at the message envelope APNIC • For messages that require a deeper inspection, the Caller ID method can be used APRICOT Domain keys • Uses public key encryption technology at the domain level - To verify an email message's sender • Uses a set of private and public encryption keys to validate the IP address (or domain) of the sender APNIC • Verify that the message's contents haven't been altered

APRICOT Domain keys • Spammers and phishers will fool these security techniques - By making their messages appear to originate from trusted domains • Authentication alone is insufficient • ISPs can allow authenticated email messages to bypass spam filters - Free the resources to interrogate unauthenticated messages APRICOT **Prevention & solutions: ISPs** Legal solutions APRICOT Legal solutions • Legislation that targets fraudulent or destructive conduct • Falsified header information - Falsified or forged headers can be made illegal • Need to be careful as many users change their Reply-To information for legitimate purposes

APRICOT Legal solutions · Focus on damage - Illegal to send emails with falsified routing information • that are reasonably likely to disrupt the normal operation of a computer, website or email address Labeling - [ADV:] or [ADV:ADLT] at the beginning of a subject line APRICOT Legal solutions • Mandatory unsubscribe or opt-out (options to reject emails) requirements · Restrictions on email harvesting or list sharing - In principle it is not right to outlaw the collection of information from websites APNIC O • Opt-in (options to receive email) APRICOT Spam filtering & anti-spam services



Mailbox filtering in email programs

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- · Use mail folders
 - Spam can go into the trash folder
- Create filters which tell the email program to sort incoming messages into the folders
 - Most email programs include filters

Mail folders and mail boxes

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- If you subscribe to email mailing lists (newsletter style or discussion lists)
 - Create a folder for each mailing list so that the mail program can move messages to the appropriate folder

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APRICOT **Using filters** • Create a filter telling the email program - Which message to move • To address, From address, Subject line, or the body of the message - Where to move the message • Specify the name of the mail folder to move the message to • Good to create multiple filters as there are different kinds of spam APRICOT Identifying spam for filtering • Drug names or body parts mentioned on the subject line - Ex: Viagra, enhancement etc • Classic spam subject lines - Phrases like cartridge prices, mass mailer, get out of debts etc APNIC Domain names of known spammers - Select and trash all messages where the From address ends in that domain name APRICOT Identifying spam for filtering Bogus username - Spammers sometimes send messages with the From address friend@somedomain.com · Messages identified as spam by another spam filter APNIC - ISPs or mail provider may use spamfiltering software and may be tagged as "Suspected spam"

APRICOT Filtering - another approach • Sometimes it's hard to identify spam • So, filter everything except spam · Create filters for - Work (coworkers, colleagues, etc.) - Friends and family - Newsletters and mailing lists etc. APRICOT Spammer's tricks to evade filters Capitalisation - eg: filter may look for spammersrus.com but spammers can use SpammersRus.com - Many spam messages contain only graphical image of text · Wrods Speled w.r.o.n.g · Hidden bogus codes - Ex: instead of make money it says ma<m>ke - Filter can get confused with the HTML tags APRICOT Server-side spam filtering • If you run a mail server, recommend running spam filtering software for users • Server filters can do a better job than user filters - Server has access to the entire stream of incoming mail APNIC • Spam and virus filtering can be done at the same time

APRICOT Server-side spam filtering · Users don't have to download the spam - Filters can reject mail or divert to separate mail box in the server · Users don't need to install their own filtering software • No need to try to support different random filtering programs that users download from the web APRICOT Server filtering techniques · IP address filtering - Most filters let you set IP address ranges to blacklist or whitelist directly - Using shared blacklists and whitelists distributed via DNS is common · Bulk counting APNIC - These filters look at incoming mail to try to recognise when many similar messages are arriving APRICOT Server filtering techniques Timing techniques and greylists - Filters can often detect spam by looking at peculiarities of the rate at which it arrives · Body filters - These filters look at the contents of spam APNIC - As the server filter can see all incoming mail, Bayesian and other adaptive techniques can use a larger sample base

APRICOT **DNS** blacklists and whitelists · Reject mail based on its sending IP address - For a message coming from an IP that's known to send no spam the mail system can bypass the rest of the filters • Standard way to distribute shared lists of IP addresses is DNSBL (DNSbased list) - Originally Realtime Blackhole List (RBL) - DNSBL work by making up a domain name for every possible IP address MAPRICOT **Popular DNSBLs** • Spamhaus Block List (SBL) - www.spamhaus.org/sbl - Most widely used DNSBL - Lists verified high volume spam sources • Composite Blocking List (CBL) - http://cbl.abuseat.org - An automatically maintained list of sources of verified spam - This list blocks lots of spam sent through open proxies and other hijacked machines APRICOT **Popular DNSBLs** • Relay Stop List (RSL) http://relays.visi.com - An automatically maintained list of verified, insecure open relays with history of sending Open Relay DataBase(ORDB) - http://www.ordb.org APNIC • Not Just Another Bogus List (NJABL) - http://njabl.org - Combination list of open relays, proxies, dialups and spam sources

MAPRICOT **Popular DNSBLs** Easynet lists http://abuse.easynet.nl DNSBL of spam sources, insecure open proxies, and dialup and similar dynamically assigned addresses that shouldn't be sending mail directly • SpamCop Blocking List - http://spamcop.net/bl.shtml - A list of spam sources driven by user reports MAPS RBL PLUS - http://www.mail-abuse.org - Descendant of the original RBL Includes RBL (spam sources), DUL(dial-up and dynamic address ranges), RSS(open relays) and OPL(open MAPRICOT **Bulk counting** • One of the most effective approaches · Each time a message arrives, the filter makes a hash (compressed) code representing the contents of the message Looks in the database to see how many other messages arrived recently with the APNIC same hash code • If it's several, the message is probably a spam APRICOT **Bulk counting** Spammers tend to change their messages to avoid bulk counting filters · Effective bulk counting filters should have "fuzzy" hash codes - Designed to disregard minor differences between one copy of the message and APNIC APNIC another · Any bulk counting system needs to be configured to whitelists

APRICOT **Bulk counting** • Bulk counting doesn't need to be restricted to a single mail server - Can exchange hash code information among many servers Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse - www.dcc-servers.net - Networks that handle small amounts of mail (fewer than about 50K messages a day) can use public DCC servers - Larger mail users should arrange to run their own DCC server APRICOT **Timing and greylists** • Most spam is sent by spamware · As there are no error checkings, viruses and worms can get away • These spamware and viruses can be detected by looking for timing peculiarities caused by the lack of error checking APRICOT **Timing and greylists** · During mail exchange, the sequence of commands & status messages are predictable for successful message delivery - Spamware sends all the commands without waiting for replies · Server can check to see whether the sending computer is getting ahead of the APNIC - Conclude that the mail is coming from spamware or a virus than a real mail client

APRICOT **Timing and greylists** · A mail server can be short of disk space or other problem that temporarily keep it from receiving mail - It returns temporary error status codes • Real mail programs retry the message • But spamware and viruses don't bother APRICOT **Timing and greylists** • With greylisting when a server sees an incoming message from an unknown server: - The server returns a temporary rejection message and keep track of the IP addresses • If the sender retries the same message reasonably soon (by the same IP) - Server accepts the future mail from that IP without delays - If not continue to send temporary rejections to mail from that IP APRICOT **Timing and greylists** • This process might create delays - Rejects nearly all mail sent by spamware • Both these timing and greylists have to be implemented in mail server software - Only the server knows the timing of incoming mail

APRICOT **Combination filtering** · Sequentially filtering - Apply multiple tests sequentially - Do the IP tests first as the remote host connects • Then the bulk tests • And the body tests - If any of the tests identify a message as spam, the filter stops and doesn't do any more testing on that message APRICOT **Combination filtering** · Scoring filters - Run all their tests, assign a weight to each test and add the weights of the tests that the message passed - If the score is above a threshold level, the message is considered to be spam • Sequential filters can be much faster because they often don't need to run the full set of tests - But harder to tune than scoring filters APRICOT Filtering on UNIX/LINUX servers · Most of the email software and filtering addons for UNIX are open source or freeware · Most widely used UNIX mail server is sendmail - Provisions to plug in many mail filters with direct support for DNSBLs and a *milter* (mail filter) APNIC • Other popular mail servers (Exim, postfix, qmail etc) also supports DNSBLs

Filtering on UNIX/LINUX servers

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- UNIX/Linux mail servers also use procmail filtering package
 - Procmail has its own pattern matching language (ex: write filters such as spambouncer)
- Most popular UNIX/Linux filter is SpamAssassin
 - www.spamassassin.org
 - Can use DNSBLs, DCC and Razor along with fixed, heuristic, and Bayesian filters

Anti-spam programs

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- Most of the email programs may not have truly effective spam filters
- Install extra spam-filtering software & signing up for spam filtering service
 - These programs act as proxy servers
 - Extra step but lots of spam can disappear along the way

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 Runs each message through all the tests its configured to use

SpamAssassin

- Computes a *spammines* score, and adds a report to the message header
- Tags the message with ****SPAM****
- Administrators or users can configure the mail system to deliver tagged spam to a separate mail box or to discard it

APRICOT Anti-spam s/w for Unix • DCC (www.dcc-servers.net) - Client and server software for the DCC bulk counting system - Can be used via sendmail milter at delivery time from procmail or from SpamAssassin • Amavisd-new (www.ijs.si/software/amavisd) - Runs spam and virus filters from mail servers - Can call both SpamAssassin and an antivirus package from sendmail and other mail servers APRICOT **Anti-spam services** · Services that filter the mail inside your existing mailbox · Services that provide a new address - Filter mail sent to this address - Forward the result to the real address · Services that let you create multiple addresses - Can handout to potentially untrustworthy correspondents - Discard the addresses that get too much spam APRICOT **Anti-spam appliances** • Spam filtering is a complex and CPUintensive application • Better to dedicate a separate server • Many vendors offer anti-spam devices - Already configured with anti-spam APNIC software that logically sits between the Internet and the existing mail server

APRICOT **Anti-spam appliances** · Network mail configuration is adjusted - Incoming mail goes to the appliance which examines the mails - Then re-emails the filtered mail to the existing mail server Many vendors sell appliances containing versions of SpamAssassin, amavisd, DCC, Linux, or other freeware Unix and other freeware Anti-spam software MAPRICOT Third party services • Brightmail (brightmail.com) Provides a subscription filtering system that uses continually updated filter rules Need extra hardware • Postini (www.postini.com) - Offers filtering service Incoming mail is routed to the Postini servers which then forward the filtered mail to the customer's mail system Spam Squelcher (spamsquelcher.com) - Serves as a traffic-shaping appliance rather than a spam filter - Functions like a network router APRICOT Checklist for server spam filters · Regular updates to handle improvements in spam recognition & latest spammer tricks • Multiple filtering techniques - IP based, fixed body filters, adaptive (Bayesian) body filters, bulk counting and APNIC greylists · System-wide and per-user

configuration to deal with individual preferences, false positives and new

spam variants

Spam laws Spam laws	
♥	
discover.	
Characteristics of spam	
Solicited or unsolicited	
Characteristics of spam Solicited or unsolicited - Was the message sent to someone who specifically asked to receive it? Permission and relationship - Did the recipient of the email address give permission, either expressed or in	
Permission and relationship	
- Did the recipient of the email address give permission, either expressed or in	
some sort of implied fashion?	
• Commercial or noncommercial	
Commercial or noncommercial Does the email message advertise the commercial availability of a product or	
service offered for sale or lease? etc	
• APRICOT	
Characteristics of spam	
Bulk or not bulk	
Characteristics of spam Bulk or not bulk Was the email sent in bulk to hundreds or thousands or millions of recipients? Email or something else? Is the message coming via email or popula window etc?	
• Email or something else?	
- Is the message coming via email or popup window etc?	
– Does the email message contain any	
forged information such as a false From address or non-existent Reply-To address	

APRICOT **Characteristics of spam** • Misleading subject lines - Does the email message try to mislead the recipient? Fraudulent content - Is the email message advertising an illegal getrich scheme or a bogus work from home? etc · Bogus opt-out - Does the message offer to remove you from its mailing list, but when you click the link the removal web page doesn't exist? APRICOT Spam laws • Opt-in or opt-out options - Commercial emails to contain some type of instructions telling recipients how to get off future mailings by that company • ADV or ADLT labels - Commercial email to be labeled with some variation of the letters ADV or ADLT MAPRICOT APNIC Asia Pacific Network Information Centra Spam laws · Contact info - email to contain the company's name and a physical address or other contact information • No using third party's domain name - Using anybody else's domain name to send spam without their permission

Centre	*APRICOT	
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		
cific Network	Spam laws - a comparison	
Asia Par		
S N		
APNIC		
	*APRICOT	1
ion Centre	Australian Spam Act 2003	
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	The Spam Act 2003 refers to spam as "unsolicited commercial electronic	
iific Netw	messaging". The Spam Act mandates that such	
Asia Pac	messages must not be sent.	
2	Became law on: 12 Dec 2003	
APNIC	 All provisions of the Spam Act came into effect on: 10 Apr 2004 	
0		
altre	MAPRICOT	
nation Cer	Messages covered by the Act	
work Infor	The Spam Act 2003 covers commercial electronic messages that are sent by	
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre	applications such as: – Email	
Asia	Short message service (SMS)	
0 =	– Multimedia messages service (MMS)– Instant messaging (iM)	
APNIC		
0		

APRICOT What is considered as spam? • Electronic messaging (emails, SMS, etc.) · Commercial in nature • Unsolicited – sent without prior consent • The Spam Act 2003 makes no reference to bulk messaging - A single unsolicited commercial electronic message could be a spam APRICOT The penalties • A business found to be in breach of the Spam Act may be subjected to a penalty of up to AU\$220,000 for a single day's contraventions · Repeated breaches may result in penalty of up to AU\$1.1 million APRICOT 3 steps to ensure compliance Step 1 - Consent Your commercial messages should only be sent when you have consent ✓express consent ✓infer consent Your commercial messages should Step 2 - Identify always contain clear and accurate identify sender identification and how they can be contacted APNIC Step 3 - Unsubscribe Your commercial messages should

unsubscribe

5 working days

contain an unsubscribe facility, allowing recipient to opt-out from

receiving future messages

APRICOT Coverage of Australia's Spam Act • The provisions of the Spam Act cover commercial electronic messages: - Originating in Australia that are sent to any destination - Originating overseas that are sent to an address accessed in Australia APRICOT **International laws** • Enforcement of penalties relating to spam coming from overseas can be problematic until international arrangements are in place • Often these laws vary subtly from country to country APRICOT **The United States** · Birthplace of spam • Stronger distinction between: - Commercial and non-commercial spam - Because of need to protect the First Amendment (freedom of speech) • In many cases judgements against spammers difficult to enforce - Offenders unable to pay the fines - Cross-jurisdictional issues

Europe

 European Union approach to spam differs from US
 Broad and consistent framework for European nation state legislation
 Strongly focused on protection of individual and societal rights
 In respect to personal and data privacy
 Essentially technology neutral
 Email, SMS, fax, or automated calling machines

WAPRICOT

Was Pacific Network Information Centre

Handling spam

One of the Pacific Network Information Centre

Was pacific Network Information Centre

The Pacific Ne

Email headers

Return-Path: hptimeline@yahoo.com
Received: from ns.isoutsider.com (unknown
[210.109.171.2]) by receiving.my-isp.com
[8.93.8.9.3) with ESMTP id FSW930923; Sun, 31 Aug
2003 22:59:28 -700 (PDT)
Received: from adventures (CPE 65-31-127-1.wi.rr.com (65.31.127.1]) by
ns.ioutsider.com (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id
hyptkK09863; Sun, 31 Aug 2003 22:56:22 +0900
Message - Id:
200308191.h7JK09867@ns.isoutsider.com
Received: from billclinton.whitehouse.gov
([184.325.23.124]) by mailout.yahoo.com (Postfix)
With SMTP id 7600A32641; Sun, 31 Aug 2003 11:40:44
-0700 (PDT)
From: hptimeline@yahoo.com
To: <undisclosed.Recipients>
Subject: Look Great for the Spring with Discounts
on HGH (human Growth hormone)!!!!
Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2003 02:10:21 -0800
MMTM-Version: 1.0
Reply-To: hptimeline@yahoo.com
Errors-To: pow@163.com

Following the flow of email headers

MAPRICOT

- Every time an email message passes through a mail server, that system adds a received line
- The most recent one should be the one that says who delivered to your ISP

Received: from ns.isoutsider.com (unknown [210.109.171.2]) by receiving.my-isp.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FSW930923; Sun, 31 Aug 2003 22:59:28 -700 (FDT)

APNIC 🗞

APNIC

Following the flow of email headers

APRICOT

 As you are sure that your ISP may not be sending you spam, you can look for ns.isoutsider.com

Received: from adventures (CPE - 65-31-127-1.wi.rr.com [65.31.127.1]) by ns.ioutsider.com (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id h7/FLKK09863; Sun, 31 Aug 2003 22:55:22 +0900

· adventures is the suspect

- Appears to be CPE-65-31-127-1.wi.rr.com

Following the flow of email headers

APRICOT

Received: from billclinton.whitehouse.gov ([184,325.23.124]) by mailout.yahoo.com (Postfix) With SMTP id 7600A32641; Sun, 31 Aug 2003 11:40:44 -0700 (PDT)

- Suspicions about the legitimacy of this Received line
- Seems you have reached a deadend
 - Leaves with adventures or CPE-65-31-127-1.wi.rr.com as the end of the trail

APNIC APNIC

Looking at the last verifiable mail handling server • Use a tool (nslookup) which enables

APRICOT

APRICOT

APRICOT

- Use a tool (nslookup) which enables you to find out whether these computer names and IP addresses match each other
 - Forward and reverse lookups

Ns.isoutsider.com resolves to 210.109.171.2 CPE-65-31-127-1.wi.rr.com resolves to 65.31.127.1 Error - billclinton.whitehouse.gove doesn't exist

MAP ®

Investigating contents of spam

Example

Wholesale Prescription Medications
DISCREET OVERNIGHT PHARMACY !

Now get HGH, Vicodin, Sex Organ Enhancements, Prozac, Viagr@, BustPro, Zoloft, Propecia. And many, many more! Just e-mail doctorfeelgood328@yahoo.com, or visit our website at http://1024349897/HGH_13/specialoffer.html

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APNIC

- Web page address looks a bit strange
 - 1024349897 translates into 61.14.86.201
 - URL tool www.samspade.org/t
 - Translates to c201.h061014086.is.net.tw

Address the complaints

- Most of the ISPs have their terms of service on their websites
 - Prohibits any form of spam-related activity
 - Provide an address for filing the complaints
 - Most commonly abuse@followed by the domain name
- Use default complaint addresses abuse@ or postmaster@ at the domain in question

APRICOT Address the complaints • Sign-up for Abuse.net service - Ask it to forward your mail to the appropriate place or get more information - Point the browser at www.abuse.net/lookup.phtml and look for the domain APRICOT Important tools: Do it yourself • APNIC Whois DB Geektools · Abuse.net forwarding service - Just address your complain to Domainname@abuse.net - Or www.abuse.net/lookup.phtml · Send the complaints to - abuse@ioutsider.com - abuse@rr.com - abuse@yahoo.com etc APRICOT **Sending complaints** • Nicely © - Don't transfer your anger at spammer to the ISP - Spamming isn't really ISP's fault Dear Administrator, I received a piece of spam that I have attached below. The headers appear to have originated at RoadRunner and been relayed via ns.isoutsider.com, and it advertises both a mailbox at Yahoo.com and a webpage at is.net.tw. please take appropriate action to stop this spammer. APNIC Thanks!

APRICOT **Sending complaints** • Make sure you attach a complete copy of the spam - Including all headers - Turn off any HTML or RTF formatting Bold, colored stuff, embedded pictures etc - Send the message in plain text • Some ISPs send acknowledgements but some do not - Most departments handling abuse are overworked and understaffed - Let them kill a few more spammers instead of responding to you $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{G}}$ APRICOT **Sending complaints** · Sometimes the complaints can bounce back as undeliverable Try some whois inquiries whether you can find more addresses where you can send the complaints • Many don't clear the mess caused by spammers - Spammers know that and they relay their spam off site to these countries APRICOT **Sending complaints** • There is a possibility that even if you complain to the ISP, complaints are bouncing back and the spam is still flowing - Some times the ISPs doesn't care much about the problems caused by spammers APNIC · However the upstream ISPs may be able to help you

APRICOT **Sending complaints** • Use traceroute to find out where the spammer is getting the internet connection · Using traceroute - Command line - www.geektools.com - www.tracert.com/cgi-bin/trace.pl APRICOT Sending complaints • Sometimes the results of traceroute can go cold after a private IP address · So find the upstreams using whois • Don't complain to IANA © If everything fails: - send documentation of your efforts to your ISP and ask it to block the spamming sites at their routers • If ISP is not responsive, it's time to look for an ISP who offers better services APRICOT Fighting spam with spam Not a good idea • One of the common tricks of the spammer is to relay their messages via an innocent third party mail server - So don't flood the innocent site with your complaints APNIC A common trick is to forge mail headers - Looks like the mail originated elsewhere · So if ISP claims innocence don't fight back! - They may really be innocent

APRICOT If blacklisted - What ISPs should do? · Contact the blacklist directly • Need to requests the blacklists to quickly de-list you - Submit a request to retest your "repaired" mail - Propagation time after you are de-listed (may be ~ a week or so) Destination mail server administrators pull the updated lists at times they prefer APNIC APNIC After that make sure your anti-virus software is updated, well maintained and your network is secured • Don't send any more spam APRICOT **APNIC's involvement** APRICOT **Detecting the abuse** • Software to detect network abuse - Mostly designed to search the ARIN Whois database - May refer to APNIC · Many websites with whois lookup functions APNIC - has the same limitations • However the IP addresses are registered by four RIRs on a regional basis

APRICOT **Detecting the abuse** • If a standard search refers you to **APNIC** - It means only that the network in question is registered in the Asia Pacific region - Does not mean that APNIC is responsible or that the hacker/spammer is using APNIC network APRICOT Investigation of complaints • APNIC is not able to investigate these complaints • Can use the APNIC Whois Database to find out where to take your complaint • APNIC does not regulate the conduct of Internet activity (legally or in practice) APRICOT Investigation of complaints · Laws relating to network abuse vary from country to country · Investigation possibilities - Cooperation of the network administrators - law enforcement agencies · Local jurisdiction • jurisdiction where the problem originates

APRICOT How can APNIC help you? • The APNIC Whois Database - Holds IP address records within the AP region - Can use this database to track down the source of the network abuse - Can find contact details of the relevant network administrators • not the individual users • use administrators log files to contact the individual involved APRICOT How can APNIC help you? • Education of network operators in the Asia Pacific community - Address policies and the importance of registration of resources • Community discussions can be raised in the APNIC open policy meetings, mailing lists, etc. APRICOT **Summary** • Background: spam • Problems, prevention & solutions - Consumers/Users, Businesses, ISPs • Spam filtering & anti-spam services · Spam laws APNIC • Handling spam • APNIC involvement

APRICOT Supplementary details • Anti-spam programs Spamotomy • http://www.spamotomy.com - About.com's spam page • http://www.netforbeginners.about.com/cs/spam About.com's email Anti-Spam Tools and Services page • http://email.about.com/cs/antispamreviews - WebAttack.com's Anti-Spam Tools page • www.webattack.com/shareware/comm/swspam.html - WebAttack Internet Tool's Anti-Spam Tools www.webattack.com/freeware/comm/fwspam.html MAPRICOT Supplementary details · Spam filtering services - Cloudmark SpamNet (www.cloudmark.com) Add-in for Outlook and Outlook Express that filters spam by using a shared database of spam "fingerprints" Despammed.com • Provides filtered email forwarded to your exising account or webmail Spamcop (<u>www.spamcop.net</u>) · Mostly a spam-reporting service and also offers filtered email addresses APRICOT References / **Acknowledgements** • Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE) http://www.cauce.org/ Federal Trade Commission - http://www.ftc.gov/index.html Spam: http://www.ftc.gov/spam/ • Privacy rights clearinghouse - http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs20-spam.htm Fighting spam on the internet APNIC http://spam.abuse.net/ · The Spamhaus project - http://www.spamhaus.org/ http://dedicated.pacbell.net/faq/FAQs_index.html

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 - http://spf.pobox.com/
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 - Fighting Spam for Dummies by John R.Levine, Margaret Levine Young & Ray Everett-Church
- SAMS Publishing

APNIC

- Canning Spam by Jeremy Poteet
- APNIC FAQ on spam & hacking help
 - http://www.apnic.net/info/faq/abuse/index.html