

Progress Report on resource certification

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APNIC

Objective



- To create a robust framework that allows validation of assertions relating to IP addresses and ASNs and their use

and

- To make it easier for anyone to see if someone is lying about actual control over addresses and/or routing!

Uses



- Signing of IRR entries

“Yes, I am the right-of-use holder and that’s *precisely* the information I entered into the IRR.”
- Signing of Routing Origination

“Yes, I am the right-of-use holder for this address prefix and I am permitting ASx to originate a route to this address prefix.”
- Signing of Route Requests

“Please route address prefix a.b.c.d/x through customer interface xxx.”

Resources for this work



- APNIC's allocation database
- Public / private key technology
- X.509 v3 certificate technology
- IP resource extensions to X.509 v3 certificates
- PKI models and trust relationships

The overall objective




- To support a PKI that mirrors the existing resource allocation state
 - Every resource allocation can be attested by a matching certificate that binds the allocated resource with the resource issuer and recipient
- To use these resource certificates to make signed assertions that can be validated through this PKI

Resource certificates




Resource
allocation
hierarchy




Resource certificates



Resource allocation hierarchy




Issued certificates match allocation actions



Resource certificates




Resource allocation hierarchy



Resource certificates




Resource allocation hierarchy



Resource certificates




Resource allocation hierarchy






Use: Routing authority



Signed objects




Route Origination Authority
“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

Signed object validation



Route Origination Authority
“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

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
Signed,
ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

1. Did the matching private key sign this text?

Signed object validation



Resource allocation hierarchy




Issued certificates

Route Origination Authority
"ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24"


Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>



2. Is this certificate valid?

Signed object validation



3. Is there a valid certificate path from a trust anchor to this certificate?

Signed object validation



Resource
allocation
hierarchy



Validation Outcomes

1. ISP4 authorized this authority document
2. 192.2.200.0/24 is a **valid** address, derived from an APNIC allocation
3. ISP4 holds a current right-of-use of 192.2.200.0/24
4. A route object, where AS65000 originates an advertisement for the address prefix 192.2.200.0/24, has the explicit authority of ISP4, who is the current holder of this address prefix

Route Origination Authority

“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”



Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,

ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>



Example of a Signed Object



```

netnum-set: RS-TELSTRA-AU-EX1
descr:      Example routes for customer with space under apnic
members:    58.160.1.0-58.160.16.255,203.34.33.0/24
tech-c:     GM85-AP
admin-c:    GM85-AP
notify:     test@telstra.net
mnt-by:     MAINT-AU-TELSTRA-AP
sigcert:    rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
            Ck010p5Q/Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmvOVGjU.cer
sigblck:    -----BEGIN PKCS7-----
            MIIBdQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIBZjCCAWICAQEzCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMAsGCSqGSIb3
            DQEHATGCAUEwggE9AgEBMBowFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKdGVsc3RyYS1hdQIBATAJBgUr
            DgMCGgUAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAEZGI2dAG31AAGi+mAK/S5bsNrgEH0mN
            11eJF9aqM+jVO+tiCvRHYPMeBMiP6yoCm2h5RCR/avP40U4CC3QMhU98tw2Bq0TY
            HZvqXfA0VhjD4Apx4KjiAyr8tfeC7ZDh0+fpvsydV2XXtHivjwjcl4GvM/gES6dJ
            KJYFWl rPqQnFTFMm5oLWBUhNjuX2E89qyQf2YZVizITTNg31y1nwqBoAqmmDhDy
            +nsRVAxax7II2iQDTr/pjI2VWfe4R36gbT8oxyvJ9xz7I9IKpB8RTvPV02I2HbMI
            ISvRXMx5nQOXyYG3Pcxo/PAhbBkVkgfudLki/IzB3j+4M8KemrnVMRo=
            -----END PKCS7-----
changed:    test@telstra.net 20060822
source:     APNIC
    
```


Signer's resource certificate



Version: 3

Serial: 1

Issuer: CN=telstra-au

Validity: Not Before: Fri Aug 18 04:46:18 2006 GMT

Validity: Not After: Sat Aug 18 04:46:18 2007 GMT

Subject: CN=An example sub-space from Telstra IANA, E=apnic-ca@apnic.net

Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmvOVGjU

Subject Info Access: caRepository -

rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q/Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmvOVGjU

Key Usage: DigitalSignature, nonRepudiation

CRL Distribution Points:

rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q.crl

Authority Info Access: caIssuers -

rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q.cer

Authority Key Identifier:

Key Identifier g(AKI): cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5Ck010p5Q

Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2

IPv4: 58.160.1.0-58.160.16.255, 203.34.33.0/24



Trial activity status



- ➔ Specification of X.509 resource certificates
- ➔ Generation of resource certificate repositories aligned with existing resource allocations and assignments
- ➔ Tools for registration authority / certificate authority interaction (undertaken by RIPE NCC)
- ➔ Tools to perform validation of resource certificate extensions to OpenSSL for Resource Certificates (open source development activity, supported by ARIN)

Current activities

- ② Tools for resource collection management, object signing and signed object validation (APNIC, and also open source development activity, supported by ARIN)
- ② LIR / ISP Tools for certificate management
- ② Testing, testing, testing
- ② Operational service profile specification

Working notes and related material we've been working on in this trial activity:

<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts>

Focus points for Q1 2007




- Can we design the certificate management subsystem to be an largely automated “slave” of the resource allocation function?
- Provide a toolset to allow IRs to manage certificate issuance
- Use the same toolset to provide ‘hosted’ certificate services

Focus points for Q1 2007



- Defining the components and interactions of a “certificate engine”



Focus points for Q1 2007



- Automated certificate issuance
 - Query / response interaction between registry and registry clients:
 - **List:** What resources have been allocated to me and what's the corresponding state of issued certificates?
 - **Issue:** Here is a certificate request – please issue me with a certificate that matches my allocated resource set
 - **Remove:** Please revoke certificates issued with this public key

Next steps



- Development of the Certificate Engine
- End entity Certificates
- Tools for relying parties
- Evaluation of progress

Thank you

<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts>

Questions?